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The Philosophy of the Daodejing |
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The Philosophy of the Daodejing
© Kile Jones 2007
For those of us still stuck in the spiritually backward perspective of
trying to ‘make sense’ of the text, the Daodejing presents numerous paradoxes.[1]
Philip
Ivanhoe hit the nail on the head regarding the difficulties facing Western
scholarship in its attempt to ‘make sense’ out of the Daodejing. This ancient Eastern text does not
contain the Western philosophical categories employed by the Greeks,
Neo-Platonists, Medieval’s, Enlightenment thinkers, and contemporary
European and American philosophers and thus finds itself landing on confused
and sometimes calloused minds. This
is why when the Daodejing says things
like “what is there arises from what is not there”,[2] “without going out
the door, one can know the whole world”,[3] and
“straightforward words seem paradoxical”,[4] a baffled look comes
across the faces of Western scholars.
Most Western scholars in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Russell, and
Frege would dissect these sentences into truth value, internal consistency, and
propositional attitude which are a far cry, methodologically speaking, from
what the Daodejing was meant for and
concerned with; therefore, approaching the philosophy of this text as a
Western-minded individual places me in the humbling position of wrestling
through this ancient book and searching for its meaning.
Methodological Concerns
Since it is obvious that
the methodology of the West and the East differs so radically a few comments
are in order about the way in which this paper will be structured. Rather then approaching this text as an
‘other’ that needs to be opposed and eventually refuted, I will attempt
to lay out what I feel the Daodejing
itself considers primary. Upon
reading this text it becomes apparent that a few concepts are extremely
important, not just for Western concerns, but for the concerns of the writer(s)
themselves. These few concepts are
the Dao, the One, the nature of Paradox, Ziran, and Wu Wei. Of course there are many more teachings
which the Daodejing promotes,
specifically regarding politics and social history that will be left out; this
is more due to time and space than anything, especially considering that many
great scholars have tackled these issues with immense detail.
The Dao
Of central concern to the Daodejing is the concept of the dao, which is usually translated as
“Way”, “Path”, or “Method.” The Daodejing
describes the dao as an “empty
vessel”;[5] as “vague and
elusive”;[6] and as the “mother
of heaven and earth”;[7] yet ironically the dao is “forever nameless”[8] and “without
name.”[9] As a psychological definition, LaFargue
describes the dao as a
“hypostatized internal presence”, “force”, or
“power”, which has the ability to “bring people a true
understanding of things”,[10] and as a cosmological
definition Wong describes the dao as
“an impersonal and unnamed force behind the workings of the
universe.”[11] Alan Chan concludes that the dao is thought of as “the source
of all being” yet that “it cannot be itself a being”, for
then “the problem of infinite regress cannot be overcome.”[12] Each of these definitions, though fair
to the Daodejing and Taoism in
general, are only able to give partially definitive and denotative surety due
to the elusive nature of the dao and
the inability of language to penetrate its true essence. This is true of all definitions, yet, as
was shown earlier, the Daodejing
makes many attempts at doing so.
Therefore, the next
question we must ask is whether or not we can make any philosophical sense out
of the concept of the dao, or
attribute to it any positive predicate.
Is the dao a being, entity,
thing, or have any ontological predicates at all? Or is it a non-being, abstraction, or
phantasm? Could we liken it to
Hegel’s Zeitgeist, Emerson’s Over-soul, or the Hindu Brahman? All of these questions reveal the
difficulty of defining the dao, and
should place any scholar in a place of careful study. What is known is that the Daodejing thinks of the dao as the greatest principle, whether
internal or external, psychological or cosmological, that people should align
themselves with in order to see things as they truly are. This is why there is such a strong
emphasis on the dao in the Daodejing, for the impetus towards it is
the impetus towards self discovery, knowledge, and ultimate reality.
Psychological Dao
One of the many ways in
which the dao can be thought of is as
a psychological force that produces and is reached by self-cultivation,
meditation, health, and various other mental states. This way of looking at the dao is sometimes referred to as
‘practical’, ‘alchemical’, or ‘earthly
Taoism’, for it focuses more on the ways in which individuals interact
with the dao then any kind of grand
scale Meta-narrative of the cosmos.
Thus we have the Daodejing
saying, in regard to personal piety and self-cultivation, that “only the dao is good at providing [for persons]
and completing [persons];”[13] that there “were
those good at practicing the dao;”[14] and to “embody the dao is to be long lived.”[15] The Psychological dao would visualized as such:
Dao
![]()
![]()
Dao Individual
Dao
Dao
These and many more
passages seem to speak of the dao as
something that should be followed and entered into. This way of viewing the dao is similar to the Christian’s
view of the Holy Spirit and the Cabbalist’s view of the Serifot, where
the higher spirit, force, or principle is to be followed for the sake of
material and spiritual blessings.
There is conflict, however, between this emphasis in the Daodejing and other passages which
promote non-action (wu-wei) and emphasize the unattainable nature of the dao.[16] Yet, without being taken to extremes,
the Daodejing could be interpreted as
promoting action and striving in one sense and time and promoting its opposite
(wu-wei) in another sense and time.
Cosmological Dao
Another way in which the Daodejing describes the dao is as a cosmological force involved
in creating and sustaining the universe.
Such is the idea when the Daodejing
says, “The dao produces the
One. The One produces the two. Two produces three. Three produces the myriad
creatures.”[17] This cosmological framework would look
something like what follows:
Dao
![]()
One
Yin-Yang
![]()
![]()
![]()
![]()
![]()
One Two Three
Cosmos
Not only is the world produced by the
dao; it runs towards it:
“streams and torrents flow into rivers and oceans, just as the world
flows into the dao.”[18] Likewise, the dao providentially upholds the cosmos; “the myriad creatures
rely upon it [dao] for life”[19] and “it [dao] takes from what has excess; it
augments what is deficient.”[20] Here we have the dao revealed in strikingly theistic terms, yet one should not think
of the dao as a transcendent deity,
but as Huston Smith wisely put it, as the “above all, behind all, beneath
all…Womb from which all life springs and to which it returns.”[21] The dao,
according to Liu Xiaogan, “is God but without an active and defining
consciousness to it”, for the dao is
“void and indefinitely open” whereas God is “full and
definite.”[22]
The One
Similar to the concept of
the dao is, though of less
importance, is the idea of the “One.” As was noted earlier, the Daodejing speaks of how the dao “produced the One” and
that from this “One” came the multiplicity of the cosmos. From a linear time-based model it would
seem that the dao created the One and
the One created the two in a discursive, chronological, and ontological
sense. If uncritical, we might be
lead to think of the dao and as a
‘thing’ or ‘substance’ which would not be consistent
with it being describes as “empty.” We must always remember that the dao is non-being, negation, and
nothingness, and therefore cannot be categorized in ontological terms. The question now arises whether the One,
which was produced by the dao, is a
substance? There are really two
ways to answer this question. The
first is to believe that the non-being (dao)
produced a being (One) and that from this original unified substance came all
of the diverse objects in the universe.
The second is to think that the difference between the dao and the One is only conceptual and
not ontological.
The first explanation
aligns itself with proto-typical religious cosmology, the only difference being
an Eastern being-from-non-being model.
Under this model the ‘One’ is the unified cradle of life in
which the yin and yang forces operate and in which all life lives and moves. While discussing Ho-shang-kung’s
(179-59 B.C.E.) commentary on the Daodejing,
Alan Chan describes the One as the “original substance of life itself,
energy in its most pure and potent form” since it is considered the
“vital essence of the Tao.”[23] The second way in which the One is
thought of is as another concept of the dao
itself, only put in a different manner.
The famous ancient commentator on the Daodejing and the I Ching,
Wang Pi (226-49 C.E.), thinks that the concept of the One ultimately falls back
into non-being, since the One is only a metaphor for a concept and not be
understood univocally. Chan likewise
comments on Wang Pi’s thought:
For
Wang Pi the question of beginning cannot be resolved unless the absolute
otherness of Tao is taken seriously.
Dialectically understood, the concept of “One” ultimately
rejoins that of nonbeing.
Cosmological interpretations in general and Ho-shang-kung’s in
particular are thus philosophically untenable, for they project a false image
of “nonbeing.” It is
entirely appropriate to portray Tao conceptually and metaphorically as
“beginning,” “One,” or the “root” of all
beings; but serious misunderstanding arises when what is conceptual and
metaphoric is misread literally to represent a kind of original substance or
energy.[24]
Thus
we have two ways of looking at the concept of the One: it could be understood
as the original substance and energy from which all life came, or it can be
thought of as another symbol for the dao
and thus non-being.
The Nature of Paradox
A third primary philosophy
in the Daodejing can rightly be called
paradox. In the Daodejing there are numerous occasions
in which linguistic and epistemic paradoxes occur and how one explains them is
ultimately how one interprets the text itself. Some scholars feel that the Daodejing contains outright
contradictions (Kaltenmark); other feel that it uses paradoxes to reveal the
limits of language (Hansen); and still others think that the paradoxes reveal
the Taoist focus on balancing opposites, much like its yin/yang philosophy
(Hall, Ames). The reactionary and
satirical nature of the Daodejing
makes one ask which of these ways best answers its paradoxical statements and
thus reveals what meaning the text is attempting to convey. Therefore, I will start off by
explaining the difference between paradox and contradiction in the Daodejing, then comment on the Daodejing’s philosophy of language
and finally, give a few notes on the thesis that connects paradox with the
philosophy of yin/yang.
First and foremost it must
be said that paradoxes and contradictions are completely different things. To say that A is –A in the same
time and in the same way is a contradiction; to say that A is –A at a
different time and in a different way may seem paradoxical but it is not a
contradiction; the latter proposition takes into account time, change, and
perspective. For instance, if I
were to say that a caterpillar is physically identical with a butterfly always
and in the same way, I would be contradicting myself; yet if I were to simply
state that a caterpillar and a butterfly are ‘the same thing’, it
would sound as if I had contradicted myself, yet under further inspection what
I actually mean is that a caterpillar and a butterfly are ‘the same
thing, but one changes into the other over time”, I would not be contradicting
myself. Thus when we look at the
apparent contradictions in the Daodejing
we must take into account this distinction, even if at the end of the day we
feel that the text deliberately contradicts itself.
We
see a paradox right in the first chapter of the Daodejing when describing cosmology it states: “Nameless, it
is the beginning of heaven and earth.”[25] At this point we might ask,
“Isn’t calling something ‘Nameless’ naming
it?” Strictly speaking one
might say that this is a contradiction: for thesis (A) would be ‘the
beginning of heaven and earth is Nameless’, and its antithesis (-A) would
be, ‘I just named the Nameless.’ Yet in a more semantic and contextual
manner, it seems that this way of looking at the text is too obvious. Of course naming the unnamable is a
contradiction, this is not something new and it misses the point
completely. The question we should
ask is not ‘what does the text literally and mathematically say’,
as if interpreting the Daodejing is
like adding numbers, but rather ‘what does the text mean?’ Under this
question we can easily note that this passage in chapter 1 means that the
beginning of heaven and earth cannot be restricted, or reducible to, any single
name. This semantic/contextual
hermeneutic ties perfectly into the Daodejing’s
overall philosophy of language, which will now be commented on.
The philosophy of language
explicated by the Daodejing is
overtly anti-conventional and denotative.
Some have even titled the Daodejing’s
philosophy of language as relative, skeptical, or even nihilistic. In all of this it can easily be said
that the Daodejing claims that
ultimate reality (dao) is beyond
language and that once we try to contain the dao with language we lose it.
Edward Ch’ine, while commenting on the Taoist and Buddhist use of paradox,
notes that,
Neither the Buddhists nor the Taoists did away with language
entirely. To say that the ultimate
reality is unsayable is already a form of saying. In fact, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu and Virnalakirti all said a good
deal more than that. In doing
so, however, they were not necessarily contradicting themselves, for…the mode of
language that they each used and affirmed not only is consistent with but actually articulates their
linguistically skeptical belief that the ultimate reality is ineffable.[26]
What Ch’ine is aware of, is
that given the overall worldview of Taoism, saying that the dao is ineffable is entirely consistent,
specifically regarding its philosophy of language. We may, according to the Daodejing, speak about the dao, but that speaking is only a
tentative symbol which points towards the object, and not any essential
denotation. Thus we have a
connection between an ancient Eastern text (Daodejing)
and modern Western philosophy of language which begun under
Wittgenstein’s critique of denotation and continues in Putnam and
Kripke.
The
final interpretation of the Daodejing’s
philosophy of language is one which sees there use of paradox as connected
to their view of yin/yang. This
theory thinks that the Taoist emphasis on polarity, opposites, and paradox is
an attempt to put into language a cosmological doctrine of complimenting
forces. This interpretation sees
the thesis/antithesis put forward in the Daodejing
not as contradictions but as complimentary, symbiotic propositions which
reflect macro-cosmic movements.
This theory is highly plausible, for the yin/yang philosophy permeates
the whole text of the Daodejing; from cosmology, to anthropology, and
ending in philosophy of language.
Ziran
In the ideas of the dao,
the One, and yin/yang lies the idea of Ziran, most often translated as
‘naturalness’, but also containing the ideas of spontaneity and
self-unfolding. The literal
translation of Ziran is ‘self-so’, basically meaning ‘the
self [or any other object] as it is naturally.’[27] This concept is most often associated
with the natural ways in which the world and the people within it move. There are really three ways in which one
could analyze this concept: firstly, it can be thought of cosmologically, where
the cosmos are described as naturally unfolding; secondly, it can be described
politically, where the ruler of the people stops trying to fight against the
natural order of the world; and thirdly, it can be viewed as an ethical
admonishment towards peace, tranquility, and serenity, when an individual
recognizes her or his place within the world. I will take this order and describe what
the Daodejing says concerning Ziran in these various contexts.
Firstly,
and probably most importantly, the Daodejing describes Ziran in terms the natural operation of the world. The Daodejing says that
“the dao models itself on what is natural [Ziran];
and that “the dao is revered and Virtue honored…because
it is natural [Ziran].”[28] What these passages indicate is that
Ziran is considered some sort of law, not a law in the strict and determinative
sense, but as the way things operate naturally. Thus even the unnamable and enigmatic dao follows the dao of Ziran (way of
naturalness). Moeller describes the
concept of Ziran in juxtaposition to a classical theistic worldview which sees
God as sovereignty controlling the universe: “The Dao does not create the
world or manage it. And it does not
invent a species of “assistant managers.” Quite the opposite is the case: the Dao
lets things happen “self-so,”[Ziran] and if human beings want to
succeed, then, according to the Laozi,
they should try to follow its “non-creative” way.”[29] This natural order is to be considered
non-teleological and determined, for Ziran is the way things are in and of
themselves, not as they are in relationship to something divine beyond
themselves. This gives inherent
worth to the cosmos as they conform to the natural ways in which they are
constituted, a constitution that Lau and
Secondly,
the concept of Ziran has political ramifications. It is commonly agreed upon that the Daodejing is a text seeking to counteract
the seemingly despotic and ‘unnatural’ ways in which the Emperors
ruled ancient mainland
Thirdly,
the concept of Ziran has ethical implications. Because there is, from the assumptions
of the writers of the Daodejing,
a natural order to the world which balances itself, we must not seek to fight
against it but embrace the ever-changing readjustments of the world. If there is something
‘natural’ then there is something ‘unnatural’ which the
Daodejing strongly fights
against. These tendencies to be
unnatural, if followed, result in strife, injustice, stress, unrest, and
eventual social entropy, for they are centered upon the desire of an individual
to get more of everything. Money,
social hierarchy, big business, unjust distribution of wealth and benefits,
excessive material goods, and ecological destruction are seen as the negative
effects of the state which should be counteracted by a return to simplicity,
small community, and an open understanding to the differences between
people. All of these ethical
encouragements tie in closely to the next philosophical concept of this paper,
Wu Wei.
Wu Wei
Once
we have understood that according to the Daodejing
the “self-so” character of reality is ideal, we can then better
comprehend the ethical doctrine of Wu Wei.
Wu Wei translated literally means “does not exist (wu)- for the
sake of (wei).” This idea can
be explained in a couple of different ways. Wu Wei can imply not doing any action for
any specific purpose or it can imply “non-action” and other forms
of passivism. Thus in the Daodejing we have praises for Wu Wei; the
great sages are said to “abide in non-action” (wu-wei), to
“enact non-action” (wu-wei), for they realize the “advantages
of non-action” (wu-wei).[34] Wu Wei can also imply spontaneous
action; J.J. Clarke comments:
It [wu wei] literally means ‘not
doing’, but as a philosophical concept it is used to characterize
spontaneity and naturalness of action devoid of conscious premeditation, and
implies non-intervention in the natural flow of things.[35]
Thus Wu Wei is characteristic of
spontaneous, uncontrived, natural, non premeditated action. The question we must now ask is how this
ethical philosophy actually works.
Does the Daodejing actually promote not doing anything? Or is Wu Wei concerned more with
intention than utility?
Firstly, it must be noted
that on a practical level the Daodejing does not advocate complete
literal non-action. This is just
too impractical for any classical Chinese philosophy. It is obvious upon reading the Daodejing
that the ideal for humanity is small communities who govern themselves by
simple and practical ethics. This
is the difference between Daoism and extreme forms of Buddhism and Chinese
asceticism. This being the case,
what exactly does Wu Wei imply? Wu
Wei certainly cannot mean continuing action in the Confusion ritualism, for
this is what the text is aiming against.
This being the case, we must determine some of the distinctive
characteristics of Wu Wei in order to clarify its meaning and goal.
Firstly, Wu Wei should be
seen as juxtaposed to Confucian ritualism.
In ancient China Confucius has established a system of ritual and ethics
that held an iron tight hold on the masses. There were proper ways to honor birth,
marriage, death, and family. These
actions eventually became formulas for appropriate ways of acting within the
family and within the society. The
problem that this system had, as with all other ritualistic systems that have
hegemony within any society, is that they leave no room for emotive and
situational spontaneous action.
Instead of the heart, they have manuals; instead of freedom, there is
duty; and instead of progress, there is tradition. This is the social atmosphere that the
writer(s) of the Daodejing found themselves christened into. Thus we have the strong reaction
contained within it, which finds its zenith in the doctrine of Wu Wei.
For the writer(s) of the Daodejing
ritualism takes the place of true heart-felt action and stifles the natural
changing processes of the created order.
That is why “those who us it [the world] ruin it. Those who grab hold of it lose
it.”[36] All action, according to the Daodejing,
must be done with meekness, acceptance, passivity, and embrace of the dao. To this Nietzsche and Rand would be
quite upset. We should not, as they
taught, use the world for our own aims by strength and fortitude, but accept
the changing world as it is. This
comes back to our earlier troubles.
Because one is to ‘accept’ the nature of the world ‘as
it is’, does not mean that one simply does nothing. Clearly the Daodejing itself is doing something by fighting
against the rigid social ethics of the Confucians. With this in mind, it seems to me that
the idea of Wu Wei is an attack on power, manipulation, and strife, yet
balanced with a humble, communal ethic that desires free choices and, as the
famed bumper sticker says, ‘random acts of kindness.”
This
is indeed a nice and friendly definition of Wu Wei, free of criticism and
attack. There are other Western
scholars who would have a divergent methodology. They would attempt the reduction ad absurdum
pertaining to Wu Wei, concluding that this ethical theory leaves individuals
immorally sitting back on the sidelines watching injustice happen. They would note that ‘to do
nothing’ leads to acceptance of injustice and all other forms of
vices. This method, I feel, is the
problem of applying Western forms of analysis to Eastern texts. As was mentioned before, the Daodejing should not be read as a
mathematics textbook, but as a whole philosophy of life which is tempered by an
understanding of balance. This is
not to say that there are not difficulties with this ethical theory, as with
all others, yet Wu Wei is not to be misconstrued as a creedal dogma closed off
to revision, but as an ethical theory which balances the extremes of
voluntarism and nihilism, which sought to rebuke the rigidity of Confucian
ritualism and the power hungry politicians in the totalitarian house of the
Emperor.
Conclusion
In
conclusion, we have seen only a minute and brief account of the philosophy of
the Daodejing. Each one of these philosophical concepts
could be analyzed infinitum and
have been done so by many gifted scholars of the field. From the perspective of the Western
analytic tradition, Daoism, specifically explicated in the Daodejing, is still fighting for a place of
consideration. The West,
specifically since Locke, Hume, and Russell, has been primarily concerned with
issues of epistemology, logical analysis, and the scientific method, all of
which are not clearly addressed in Eastern texts like the Daodejing. Thus, there has been a great disconnect
between the philosophy of the East and West. Yet times are changing. There has been a Western interest in
Eastern philosophy since Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Heidegger, which
has blossomed primarily in the now cultivated field of Philosophy of
Religion. There are now many
Western thinkers who give texts like the Daodejing
a noteworthy place in the history of philosophy. They have realized that the Eastern emphasis
on ethics, politics, and meaning are not only significant philosophically, but
also practically.
In
light of this progress, the Daodejing
should be viewed not as an awkward looking foreigner, but as a fellow comrade
in the long legacy of the history of ideas. From the concept of the dao to Wu Wei, the Daoejing presents us with a unique
perspective on life and its apparent meaning. It promotes a serene and tranquil
self-cultivation with the passivism of a Gandhi and the spontaneity of a
Dadaist. Rarely have scholars ever
seen such a text; one which balances ethical rigor and free decision making,
action and non-action, embrace of and distaste for the situation of the world,
and optimism and nihilism. This may
be seen as the Daodejing’s
attempt to balance opposites in an ever polarizing and dogmatizing
philosophical landscape. Yet as
with all philosophical and religious texts, there are those who are critical
and apologetic. I can understand
this position, for rational thinking and reasoning should be employed by all
who are on the quest of philosophy.
Yet, it is of my opinion that sometimes this mentality can lead one to
close off from the gold mine of a different and alien text. There must be the admonishment to both
think and learn critically while investigating any particular text; and if one
chooses to attempt this with the Daodejing,
it is my opinion that such a person is in for a challenging philosophical
treat.
[1] Ivanhoe, Philip, The
Daodejing of Laozi, Hackett Publishing:
[2] Ibid, chapter 40, pg 43
[3] Ibid, chapter 47, pg 50
[4] Ibid, chapter 78, pg 81
[5] Ibid, chapter 4, pg 4
[6] Ibid, chapter 21, pg 21
[7] Ibid, chapter 25, pg 25
[8] Ibid, chapter 32, pg 32
[9] Ibid, chapter 41, pg 44
[10] LaFargue, Michael, Tao and
Method, State University of New York Press:
[11] Wong, Eva, The Shambhala
Guide to Taoism, Shambhala Publications:
[12] Chan, Alan, under “Laozi” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2001, article found at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laozi/#5
[13] Ivanhoe, Philip, The
Daodejing of Laozi, Hackett Publishing:
[14] Ibid, chapter 65, pg 68
[15] Ibid, chapter 16, pg 16
[16] Such as the “embellishment of the dao” (chapter 38).
[17] Ibid, chapter 42, pg 45
[18] Ibid, chapter 32, pg 32
[19] Ibid, chapter 34, pg 34
[20] Ibid, chapter 77, pg 80
[21] Smith, Huston, The
World’s Religions, Harper Publishing:
[22] Kohn and LaFargue, Lao-Tzu
and the Tao-te-ching, State University of New York Press:
[23] Chan, Alan, A Tale of Two
Commentaries in Lao-tzu and the
Tao-te-ching, State University of New York Press:
[24] Ibid, pg 106
[25] Ivanhoe, Philip, The
Daodejing of Laozi, Hackett Publishing:
[26] Ch’ine, Edward, The Conception of Language and the use of Paradox in Buddhism and Taoism, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11, 1984, pg 375
[27] This basic definition was one laid out by Wolfgang Bauer in his China and the Search for Happiness, 1976.
[28] Ivanhoe, Philip, The
Daodejing of Laozi, Hackett Publishing:
[29] Moeller, Hans-Georg, The Philosophy of the Daodejing,
Columbia University Press:
[30] Lau and
[31] Ivanhoe, Philip, The
Daodejing of Laozi, Hackett Publishing:
[32] Ibid, chapter