Sponsors of terrorism
Iran
Groups
2002
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002.
Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence
and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist
acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism
to pursue their goals.
Iran’s record against al-Qaida has been mixed. While it
has detained and turned over to foreign governments a number of
al-Qaida members, other al-Qaida members have found virtual safehaven
there and may even be receiving protection from elements of the
Iranian Government. Iran's long, rugged borders are difficult to
monitor, and the large number of Afghan refugees in Iran complicates
efforts to locate and apprehend extremists. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that al-Qaida elements could escape the attention of Iran’s
formidable security services.
During 2002, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging
anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme
Leader Khamenei referred to Israel as a “cancerous tumor,” a
sentiment echoed by other Iranian leaders in speeches and sermons.
Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah
and Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine
Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command—with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Tehran
also encouraged Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups
to coordinate their planning and to escalate their terrorist activities
against Israel.
Iran also provided support to extremist groups in Central Asia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq with ties to al-Qaida, though less than that
provided to the groups opposed to Israel.
In 2002, Iran became party to the 1988 Protocol on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation. It is party to five of the 12 international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.
2003
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003.
Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence
and Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist
acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism
to pursue their goals.
Iran’s record against al-Qaida remains mixed. After the
fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, some al-Qaida members
fled to Iran where they have found virtual safehaven. Iranian officials
have acknowledged that Tehran detained al-Qaida operatives during
2003, including senior members. Iran’s publicized presentation
of a list to the United Nations of deportees, however, was accompanied
by a refusal to publicly identify senior members in Iranian custody
on the grounds of “security.” Iran has resisted calls
to transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries
of origin or third countries for further interrogation and trial.
During 2003, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging
anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme
Leader Khamenei praised Palestinian resistance operations, and
President Khatami reiterated Iran’s support for the “wronged
people of Palestine” and their struggles. Matching this rhetoric
with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist
groups -- notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command --
with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Iran hosted a conference
in August 2003 on the Palestinian intifadah, at which an Iranian
official suggested that the continued success of the Palestinian
resistance depended on suicide operations.
Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran’s
perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of
the Coalition. Iran has indicated support for the Iraqi Governing
Council and promised to help Iraqi reconstruction.
Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, individuals with ties
to the Revolutionary Guard may have attempted to infiltrate southern
Iraq, and elements of the Iranian Government have helped members
of Ansar al-Islam transit and find safehaven in Iran. In a Friday
Prayers sermon in Tehran in May, Guardian Council member Ayatollah
Ahmad Jannati publicly encouraged Iraqis to follow the Palestinian
model and participate in suicide operations against Coalition forces.
Iran is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism.
Sudan
Groups
2002
Sudan met with United States officials in June, 2000 to talk about
how to counteract terrorism in Sudan. Sudan has made progress in
shutting down terrorism inside its borders. Its leaders signed
12 international conventions against terrorism and shut down operations
for Popular Arab and Islamic Conference. Sudan still allows terrorists
to come into the country and hide from their enemies.
Sudan was cooperating with US counterterrorism efforts before
11 September 2001, which included a close relationship with various
US Government agencies to investigate and apprehend extremists
suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Sudan is a party
to 11 of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating
to terrorism. Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to
end the civil war that has been ongoing since 1983—a US policy
priority that parallels the US objective of having Sudan deny safehaven
to terrorists.
While concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government support for
certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic
Jihad, the United States is pleased with Sudan’s cooperation
and the progress being made in their antiterrorist activities.
2003
Sudan in 2003 deepened its cooperation with the US Government
to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement
in terrorist activities. Overall, Sudan’s cooperation and
information sharing has improved markedly, producing significant
progress in combating terrorist activity, but areas of concern
remain.
Domestically, Khartoum stepped up efforts to disrupt extremist
activities and deter terrorists from operating in Sudan. In May,
Sudanese authorities raided a probable terrorist training camp
in Kurdufan State, arresting more than a dozen extremists and seizing
illegal weapons. The majority of the trainees captured were Saudi
citizens and were extradited to Saudi Arabia to face charges in
accordance with a bilateral agreement. In June, the Sudanese Government
detained several individuals linked to the publication of an alleged “hit
list” attributed to the terrorist group al-Takfir wa al-Hijra.
The list called for the killing of 11 prominent Sudanese Christian
and leftist politicians, jurists, journalists, and others. In September,
a Sudanese court convicted a Syrian engineer and two Sudanese nationals
of training a group of Saudis, Palestinians, and others to carry
out attacks in Iraq, Eritrea, Sudan, and Israel. A court statement
said the Syrian was training others to carry out attacks against
US forces in Iraq.
There were no international terrorist attacks in Sudan during
2003. Khartoum throughout the year placed a high priority on the
protection of US citizens and facilities in Sudan. In November,
the authorities stepped up their efforts to protect the US Embassy,
which temporarily suspended operations in response to a terrorist
threat that was deemed credible. Earlier in the year, Sudanese
authorities closed a major Khartoum thoroughfare to enhance the
Embassy’s security and further upgraded security measures
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Sudanese Government also took steps in 2003 to strengthen
its legislative and bureaucratic instruments for fighting terrorism
by ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism. Sudan also ratified the African Union’s
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating
Terrorism. In June, Sudanese Minister of Justice Ali Mohamed Osman
Yassin issued a decree establishing an office for combating terrorism.
In 2003, Sudan signed a counterterrorism cooperation agreement
with the Algerian Government, which during the 1990s accused Sudan
of harboring wanted Algerian terrorists. Sudan also signed a counterterrorism
agreement with Yemen and Ethiopia.
In response to ongoing US concern over the presence in Sudan of
the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail in June said
the Sudanese Government would limit HAMAS to conducting political
activities. Visiting Sudanese peace talks in Kenya in October,
Secretary Powell said Sudan had yet to shut down the Khartoum offices
of HAMAS and the PIJ.
President Umar al-Bashir in an interview with Al-Arabiyah television
maintained that the Sudanese Government could not expel HAMAS because
it has a political relationship with the group and stated there
was no PIJ offi ce in Sudan. Responding to press reports that its
Sudan office had closed, HAMAS officials in Khartoum and Gaza in
November said that the office remained open but that the main representative
had been replaced.
Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end its long-running
civil war -- a US policy priority that complements the US goal
of denying terrorists safehaven in Sudan.
Sudan is a party to all 12 of the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism.
Cuba
Groups
*provides a safe place for terrorists
*provides a safe place for U.S. fugitives
2002
Although Cuba signed and ratified all 12 international counterterrorism
conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the US-led Coalition
prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical
of many associated US policies and actions. On repeated occasions,
for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world who
provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11
investigation. Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay
base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan.
In 2002, Cuba continued to host several terrorists and US fugitives.
Havana permitted up to 20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty members
to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven and support
to members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) groups. Bogota was aware
of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated
that it seeks Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN agents
in Cuba.
An accused Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons expert and longtime
resident of Havana went on trial in Colombia in 2002. He had been
caught a year earlier in Colombia with two other IRA members and
detained for allegedly training the FARC in advanced use of explosives.
Some US fugitives continued to live on the island.
2003
Cuba remained opposed to the US-led Coalition prosecuting the
global war on terrorism and actively condemned many associated
US policies and actions throughout 2003. Government-controlled
press reporting about US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
were consistently critical of the United States and frequently
and baselessly alleged US involvement in violations of human rights.
Government propaganda claimed that those fighting for self-determination
or against foreign occupation are exercising internationally recognized
rights and cannot be accused of terrorism. Cuba’s delegate
to the UN said terrorism cannot be defined as including acts by
legitimate national liberation movements -- even though many such
groups clearly employ tactics that intentionally target innocent
civilians to advance their political, religious, or social agendas.
In referring to US policy toward Cuba, the delegate asserted, “acts
by states to destabilize other states is a form of terrorism.”
The Cuban Government did not extradite nor request the extradition
of suspected terrorists in 2003. Cuba continued to provide support
to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as to host
several terrorists and dozens of fugitives from US justice. The
Government refuses to return suspected terrorists to countries
when it alleges that a receiving government could not provide a
fair trial because the charges against the accused are “political.” Cuba
has publicly used this argument with respect to a number of fugitives
from US justice, including Joanne Chesimard, wanted for the murder
of a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. Havana permitted up to 20
ETA members to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven
and support to members of FARC and the ELN. Bogota was aware of
the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated
that it seeks Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN agents
in Cuba. A declaration issued by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in May 2003 maintained that the presence of ETA members
in Cuba arose from a request for assistance by Spain and Panama
and that the issue is a bilateral matter between Cuba and Spain.
The declaration similarly defended its assistance to the FARC and
the ELN as contributing to a negotiated solution in Colombia.
Dozens of fugitives from US justice have taken refuge on the island.
In a few cases, the Cuban Government has rendered fugitives from
US justice to US authorities. The salient feature of Cuba’s
behavior in this arena, however, is its refusal to render to US
justice any fugitive whose crime is judged by Cuba to be “political.”
With respect to domestic terrorism, the Government in April 2003
executed three Cubans who attempted to hijack a ferry to the United
States. The three were executed under Cuba’s 2001 “Law
Against Acts of Terrorism.”
Cuba became a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism in 2001.
Iraq
Groups
2002
Although Cuba signed and ratified all 12 international counterterrorism
conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the US-led Coalition
prosecuting the war on global terrorism and has been actively critical
of many associated US policies and actions. On repeated occasions,
for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world who
provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September 11
investigation. Cuba did not protest the use of the Guantanamo Bay
base to house enemy combatants from the conflict in Afghanistan.
In 2002, Cuba continued to host several terrorists and US fugitives.
Havana permitted up to 20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty members
to reside in Cuba and provided some degree of safehaven and support
to members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) groups. Bogota was aware
of the arrangement and apparently acquiesced; it has publicly indicated
that it seeks Cuba’s continued mediation with ELN agents
in Cuba.
An accused Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons expert and longtime
resident of Havana went on trial in Colombia in 2002. He had been
caught a year earlier in Colombia with two other IRA members and
detained for allegedly training the FARC in advanced use of explosives.
Some US fugitives continued to live on the island.
2003
(Note: Most of the attacks that have occurred during Operation
Iraqi Freedom do not meet the longstanding US definition of international
terrorism because they were directed at combatants, that is, American
and Coalition forces on duty.
Attacks against civilians and against military personnel who at
the time of the incident were unarmed and/or not on duty are judged
as terrorist attacks.)
On 7 May 2003, President Bush suspended, with respect to Iraq,
all sanctions applicable to state sponsors of terrorism, which
had the practical effect of putting Iraq on a par with nonterrorist
states. Although Iraq is still technically a designated state sponsor
of terrorism, its name can be removed from the state sponsors list
when the Secretary of State determines that it has fulfilled applicable
statutory requirements, which include having a government in place
that pledges not to support acts of terrorism in the future.
In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom removed Saddam Hussein and his
Ba’athist regime from power and liberated Iraq. Since then,
however, Iraq has become a central battleground in the global war
on terrorism. Former regime elements, who have been conducting
insurgent attacks against Coalition forces, have increasingly allied
themselves tactically and operationally with foreign fighters and
Islamic extremists, including some linked to Ansar al-Islam, al-Qaida,
and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. The line between insurgency and
terrorism has become increasingly blurred as attacks on civilian
targets have become more common. By end of the year, Coalition
forces had detained more than 300 suspected foreign fighters.
Extremists associated with al-Qaida claimed credit for several
suicide car bombings, including attacks in October against the
headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross and
three Baghdad police stations and an attack in November against
an Italian military police base in Nasiriyah. Al-Qaida associate
Abu Mus’ab al- Zarqawi -- accused of working with Ansar al-Islam
-- emerged as a key suspect in the deadly bombing of Jordan’s
Baghdad embassy in August.
After Coalition strikes destroyed Ansar al-Islam’s base
in northern Iraq in late March, Ansar al-Islam members fled across
the border and regrouped in Iran. Counterterrorist operations suggest
many of those fi ghters have since reentered Iraq and are active
in anti-Coalition activities. In September, suspected members of
Ansar al-Islam were arrested in Kirkuk carrying 1,200 kilograms
of TNT.
In November, Coalition forces killed two unidentified, high-ranking
members of Ansar al-Islam during a raid on a terrorist hideout
in Baghdad.
Other terrorist groups maintained a presence in Iraq. Members
of the foreign terrorist organization Mujahedin-e-Khalq -- which
had received military support from the regime of Saddam Hussein
-- were stripped of their weapons and placed under US military
detention. The terrorist group KADEK -- renamed the Kurdistan People’s
Congress (KHK) in the fall -- continued to proclaim its commitment
to nonviolence, while launching several attacks against Turkish
targets inside Turkey. The presence of several thousand KHK members
in northern Iraq underscores the group’s ability to carry
out terrorist operations. The KHK periodically threatens to heighten
its attacks against Turkey.
Iraq has signed eight of the 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and is a party to five.
Libya
Groups
2002
In 2002, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued the efforts he
undertook following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks to
identify Libya with the war on terrorism and the struggle against
Islamic extremism. In August, Qadhafi told visiting British officials
that he regards Usama Bin Ladin and his Libyan followers a threat
to Libya. In his 1 September speech, he declared that Libya would
combat members of al-Qaida and “heretics”—a likely
reference to Libyan extremists allied with al-Qaida and opposed
to his regime—as doggedly as the United States did. He further
claimed that all political prisoners would be released and that
the Libyan Government would henceforth only hold members of al-Qaida.
Libya appears to have curtailed its support for international terrorism,
although it may maintain residual contacts with some of its former
terrorist clients.
Libya’s past record of terrorism continued to hinder Qadhafi’s
efforts to shed Libya’s pariah status in 2002. In March,
a Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction—originally
returned in January 2001—of Libyan intelligence agent Abdel
Basset Ali al-Megrahi for murder in connection with planting an
explosive device on Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. The explosion
killed all 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 persons on the
ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. There have been reports of a proposed
out-of-court settlement of a suit brought by Pan Am 103 family
members against Libya, but by year’s end it had not been
concluded.
Despite progress toward the payment of appropriate compensation,
at year’s end Libya had yet to comply with the remaining
UN Security Council requirements related to Pan Am Flight 103,
necessary for the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, including
accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials.
In October, lawyers representing the seven US citizens who died
in the bombing of UTA Flight 772 in 1989—for which a French
court convicted six Libyans in absentia in 1999—filed a suit
against Libya and Qadhafi, reportedly seeking $3 billion in compensation.
The same month, Libya reportedly pledged to French authorities
to increase payments already made to victims of the UTA bombing
following the French court ruling in 1999.
In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1991 Convention on the Marking
of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. It is a party
to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating
to terrorism.
2003
In 2003, Libya held to its practice in recent years of curtailing
support for international terrorism, although Tripoli continues
to maintain contact with some past terrorist clients. Libyan leader
Muammar Qadhafi and other Libyan officials continued their efforts
to identify Tripoli with the international community in the war
on terrorism. During an interview in January, Qadhafi stated that
Libyan intelligence had been sharing information on al- Qaida and
other Islamic extremists with Western intelligence services and
characterized such cooperation as “irrevocable.” In
a speech marking the 34th anniversary of his revolution, he declared
that Libya and the United States had a common interest in fighting
al-Qaida and Islamic extremism.
Regarding its own terrorist past, Libya took long-awaited steps
in 2003 to address the UN requirements arising out of the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 but remained embroiled in efforts to settle
international political and legal disputes stemming from other
terrorist attacks Tripoli conducted during the 1980s.
In August, as required by the UN Security Council, the Libyan
Government officially notified the UN Security Council that it
accepted responsibility for the actions of its officials in connection
with Pan Am Flight 103 (Abdel Basset Ali al-Meghrahi, a Libyan
intelligence agent, was convicted by a Scottish court in 2001 for
his role in the bombing). Libya further confirmed that it had made
arrangements for the payment of appropriate compensation to the
families of the victims: a total of up to $2.7 billion or $10 million
for each victim. Further, Libya renounced terrorism and affirmed
its adherence to a number of UN declarations and international
conventions and protocols that the Libyan Government had signed
in the past. Libya also pledged to cooperate in good faith with
any further requests for information in connection with the Pan
Am Flight 103 investigation. In response, the Security Council
voted on 12 September to permanently lift sanctions that it had
imposed against Libya in 1992 and suspended in 1999.
In August, the Qadhafi Foundation pledged to compensate victims
wounded in the bombing in 1986 of La Belle Discotheque, a Berlin
nightclub, after a German court issued its written opinion finding
that the Libyan intelligence service had orchestrated the attack.
The original trial had concluded in 2001 with the conviction of
four individuals for carrying out the attack, in which two US servicemen
and a Turkish woman were killed and 229 persons wounded. Leaders
of the Qadhafi Foundation indicated, however, that their compensation
was a humanitarian gesture that did not constitute Libyan acceptance
of responsibility. In September, the German Government indicated
that it was engaged in talks with Libyan representatives, but at
the end of the year, no announcement had yet been made regarding
a final compensation deal.
On 19 December, Colonel Qadhafi announced that Libya would eliminate
its weapons of mass destruction programs and MTCR-class missiles
and took immediate steps to implement this public commitment with
the assistance of the United States, United Kingdom, and relevant
international organizations. The Libyan decision to reveal its
programs to the international community shed important light on
the international network of proliferators intent on subverting
nonproliferation regimes.
Libya is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism.
North Korea
Groups
2002
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK)
response to international efforts to combat terrorism was disappointing
throughout 2002, although in a statement released after the September
11 attacks, the DPRK had reiterated its public policy of opposing
terrorism and any support for terrorism. In 2001, following the
September 11 attacks, it also signed the UN Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and became a party to
the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.
Despite the urging of the international community, however, North
Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to
combat terrorism. Its initial and supplementary reports to the
UN Counterterrorism Committee on actions it had undertaken to comply
with its obligations under UNSCR 1373 were largely uninformative
and nonresponsive. It did not respond to previous US proposals
for discussions on terrorism and did not report any efforts to
freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist
acts that UNSCR 1373, among other things, requires all states to
do.
North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts
since 1987. It has sold weapons to several terrorist groups, however,
even as it reiterated its opposition to all forms of international
terrorism. Pyongyang also has provided safehaven to several Japanese
Red Army members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese
Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970.
Pyongyang continued to sell ballistic missile technology to countries
designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism,
including Syria and Libya.
North Korea is a party to six of the 12 international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.
2003
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not
known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of
a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.
Following the attacks of September 11, Pyongyang began laying
the groundwork for a new position on terrorism by framing the issue
as one of “protecting the people” and replaying language
from the Joint US-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism of
October 2000. It also announced to a visiting EU delegation that
it planned to sign the international conventions against terrorist
financing and the taking of hostages and would consider acceding
to other antiterrorism agreements.
At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang
in September 2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong
Il acknowledged the involvement of DPRK “special institutions” in
the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and said that those responsible
had already been punished. Pyongyang has allowed the return to
Tokyo of five surviving abductees and is negotiating with Tokyo
over the repatriation of their family members remaining in North
Korea. The DPRK also has been trying to resolve the issue of harboring
Japanese Red Army members involved in a jet hijacking in 1970 --
allowing the repatriation of several family members of the hijackers
to Japan.
Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps
to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism.
Syria
Groups
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-
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Abu Musa's Fatah-the-Intifada
2002
The Syrian Government has continued to provide political and limited
material support to a number of Palestinian groups, including allowing
them to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus. Some of these
groups have committed terrorist acts, but the Syrian Government
insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and
informational activities. The most notable Palestinian rejectionist
groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic
Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Syria also continued to permit Iranian
resupply, via Damascus, of Hizballah in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the
Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of
terrorism since 1986.
At the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora, Syria
has taken a leading role in espousing the view that Palestinian
and Lebanese terrorist groups fighting Israel are not terrorists;
it also has used its voice in the UN Security Council to encourage
international support for Palestinian national aspirations and
denounce Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories as “state
terrorism.”
The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States
that it will take every possible measure to protect US citizens
and facilities from terrorists in Syria. In times of increased
threat, it has increased police protection around the US Embassy.
During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism
against US citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated
significantly with the United States and other foreign governments
against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations
and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support
for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.
In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the 12 international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
2003
The Syrian Government in 2003 continued to provide political and
material support to Palestinian rejectionist groups. HAMAS, the
PIJ, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
operate from Syria, although they have lowered their public profiles
since May, when Damascus announced that the groups had voluntarily
closed their offices. Many of these groups claimed responsibility
for anti-Israeli terrorist acts in 2003; the Syrian Government
insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and
informational activities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to
use Damascus as a transshipment point for resupplying Hizballah
in Lebanon.
Syrian officials have publicly condemned international terrorism
but continue to make a distinction between terrorism and what they
consider to be the legitimate armed resistance of Palestinians
in the Occupied Territories and of Lebanese Hizballah. The Syrian
Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism
since 1986.
During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism
against US citizens in Syria. Despite tensions between the United
States and Syria about the war in Iraq and Syrian support for terrorism,
Damascus has repeatedly assured the United States that it will
take every possible measure to protect US citizens and facilities.
Damascus has cooperated with the United States and other foreign
governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist
organizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signs of
public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques.
In 2003, Syria was instrumental in returning a sought-after terrorist
planner to US custody. Since the end of the war in Iraq, Syria
has made efforts to tighten its borders with Iraq to limit the
movement of anti-Coalition foreign fighters into Iraq, a move that
has not been completely successful.
Syria is a party to seven of the 12 international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.
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